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I. INTRODUCTION
In a Seattle middle school, a young student went to her princi-
pal's office to report the sale of drugs on campus.1 The student told
the principal that she was not feeling well due to smoking marijuana.
The principal called for a police officer to investigate. When the offi-
cer arrived, the student explained that she bought the marijuana from
a classmate. The classmate was found, and admitted that he and
another classmate were selling drugs on campus. The other suspected
seller was found soon after. Before placing the second suspect under
formal arrest, the officer searched his pockets, finding a baggie con-
taining twenty bindles of cocaine powder. In addition to any charges
that developed from an investigation of sales of marijuana on campus,2
the suspect was additionally charged with the crime of possession of
cocaine with the intent to deliver.
Under a traditional application of the exclusionary rule,3 the bag-
gie of marijuana would be suppressed as the product of an unreason-
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1. This scenario is roughly based on the facts of State v. C.B., No. 39743-5-I, 1997 WL
714782 (Wash. Ct. App. Nov. 17, 1997), an unpublished opinion.
2. In C.B., the court held that, under the Aguilar- Spinelli test, facts similar to those
described in the scenario provided probable cause to arrest the defendant.
3. When evidence that would be used against a criminal defendant is the product of police
illegality, the exclusionary rule is the primary constitutional remedy of the court.
[Ihf the defendant has standing to object, he may by undertaking the appropriate pro-
cedural steps obtain a ruling as to whether certain evidence constitutes the fruit of a
violation of the Fourth Amendment, and if it is determined that the evidence is of this
character then the prosecution may not introduce it at the defendant's trial, at least in
its case in chief.
1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE § 1.6, at 156 (3d ed. 1996).
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able search. Because the officer had not yet arrested the suspect, but
merely detained him, the officer had no authority to extract nonthreat-
ening objects from the suspect's pockets. Without the cocaine evi-
dence, of course, the trial court would likely dismiss the possession
with intent to deliver charge.
Is the above outcome the only one possible? Under the U.S.
Supreme Court's inevitable discovery exception to the exclusionary
rule, the evidence could still be admitted. The prosecutor would need
to show that, prior to the search of the suspect, probable cause existed
to arrest him, that the officer was well aware of it, and that the officer
had already determined that he was going to arrest the suspect. The
prosecutor would also need to establish that the officer would have
ultimately searched the suspect after placing him under formal arrest,
and that the search would have produced the same evidence. If the
prosecutor can show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that such a
course of events would have inevitably occurred, then the evidence,
which would otherwise be suppressed, will be admitted.
Inevitable discovery is a newcomer to Washington, having only
been applied since 1995.4 The history of the inevitable discovery
doctrine in Washington, however, can be traced back to an important
dissent written by Justice James Dolliver of the Washington Supreme
Court in 1982,' as well as to the United States Supreme Court decision
of Nix v. Williams6 in 1984. Beginning with an examination of Dolli-
ver's dissent and the U.S. Supreme Court's holding in Nix, this Com-
ment will analyze the gradual acceptance of inevitable discovery by the
Washington courts. While the Washington Supreme Court has
adopted the federal version of the exception, Division One of the
Washington Court of Appeals has expanded its reach while adding
another element. Division One (and all other courts that follow its
rule) requires that the prosecution establish that the investigating offi-
cer did not act unreasonably when discovering the evidence, even
though the discovery was made during an illegal search. The Wash-
ington Supreme Court has yet to address Division One's addition,
denying review in every case.
4. State v. White, 76 Wash. App. 801, 88 P.2d 169 (1995).
5. State v. Broadnax, 98 Wash. 2d 289, 304, 654 P.2d 98, 105 (1982) (Dolliver, J., dissent-
ing).
6. 467 U.S. 431 (1984).
7. See State v. Sullivan, No. 39399-5-I, 1998 WL 100536 (Wash. Ct. App. Mar. 9, 1998),
rev. denied, 136 Wash. 2d 1024, 969 P.2d 1065 (1998) (unpublished opinion); State v. Richman,
85 Wash. App. 568, 933 P.2d 1088 (1997), rev. denied, 133 Wash. 2d 1028, 950 P.2d 478 (1997);
State v. Feller, 60 Wash. App. 678, 806 P.2d 776 (1991), rev. denied, 117 Wash. 2d 1005, 815
P.2d 265 (1991); State v. Reid, 38 Wash. App. 203, 687 P.2d 861 (1984), rev. denied, 102 Wash.
2d 1025 (1984). In State v. White, 129 Wash. 2d 105, 915 P.2d 1099 (1996), the supreme court
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This Comment will examine the substantial differences between
Division One's current version of inevitable discovery and that
adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court in Nix, which is still the only ver-
sion affirmatively accepted by the Washington Supreme Court.
Having distinguished the differences, this Comment ultimately sug-
gests an amalgamation of the most desirable parts of each version of
the inevitable discovery exception. The author proposes that the "rea-
sonableness" element demanded by Division One is duplicative and
unnecessarily burdensome on the prosecution. The version proposed
by this Comment recognizes the potential benefits to the search for
truth and to the societal interest in effective enforcement of its laws to
be realized in inevitable discovery. To counter concerns that the exclu-
sionary rule will be destroyed without the "reasonableness" require-
ment, the proposed version requires a sufficient quantum of proven
facts to prevent careless application of the inevitable discovery doc-
trine.
II. STATE V. BROADNAX-INEVITABLE DISCOVERY IN DISSENT
The discussion of inevitable discovery in Washington courts
began in an impassioned 1982 dissent. In State v. Broadnax,8 the Su-
preme Court of Washington reversed the conviction of Steven
Thompson for possession of heroin on the grounds that he had been
improperly detained and searched during the execution of a search
warrant of a residence, resulting in the impermissible collection of
contraband from Thompson's person. Officers obtained the search
warrant upon an affidavit of a narcotics detective of the Seattle Police
Department.9 The detective did not name any individuals in his affi-
davit, but stated that he had received information that drugs had been
offered for sale at the location by a man named "Clifford" within the
past twenty-four hours."° Following entry into the home to conduct
the search, Seattle Police officers detained Thompson, along with the
occupant of the home, Clifton Broadnax." The two men were told to
put their hands on their heads, and neither was frisked. 12 A short time
later, the detective who had sworn out the affidavit entered the resi-
had occasion to review the inevitable discovery exception applied by the court of appeals in its
decision, 76 Wash. App. 801, 888 P.2d 169 (1995). However, the supreme court held that the
search at issue was reasonable, and, thus, did not call for analysis of the inevitable discovery
exception. See White, 129 Wash. 2d at 112-13, 915 P.2d at 1102.
8. 98 Wash. 2d 289, 654 P.2d 96 (1982).
9. Id. at 291, 654 P.2d at 98.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 292, 654 P.2d at 99.
12. Id. at 292-93, 654 P.2d at 99 (noting that a sergeant at the scene testified at Thomp-
son's trial that he felt no need to frisk the men for weapons so long as their hands were visible).
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dence.13 Apparently due to the mistaken presumption that Thompson
had already been arrested, the detective performed a cursory search of
Thompson's person, and when he felt a small object in Thompson's
shirt pocket, he extracted it.14 The object turned out to be a balloon
containing a small amount of heroin."5 Soon after, other officers
reported that a quantity of controlled substances were found in plain
view in a bedroom." Thompson was arrested,17 although his convic-
tion resulted solely from the heroin found in his pocket."
The Supreme Court of Washington held that no reasonable sus-
picion existed to justify even a limited "patdown" search of Thomp-
son for weapons." Even assuming, for the sake of argument, that a
cursory search had been permissible, the detective exceeded the scope
of that search when he extracted the balloon from Thompson's pocket,
because the officer had determined that the object he felt was not a
weapon.2°  Finally, the court held that neither the tactile "discovery"
of the still-unknown object inside Thompson's pocket 2 nor the dis-
covery of other controlled substances in the bedroom substantiated
probable cause for Thompson's arrest.22 Because the prosecution
could offer no justification for the discovery of the heroin in Thomp-
13. Id. at 292, 654 P.2d at 99.
14. Id. at 293, 654 P.2d at 99. The court noted that the detective testified at Thompson's
trial that the object, while in Thompson's pocket, did not feel like a gun or any other weapon.
Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 291, 654 P.2d at 98.
19. Id. at 295, 654 P.2d at 100.
20. Id. at 297, 654 P.2d at 101.
21. Id. at 297-98, 654 P.2d at 102. The court rejected the State's argument for probable
cause on the basis of a "plain feel" discovery of incriminating evidence. The court held that the
detective had no justification for searching Thompson, and that feeling a soft bulge in his shirt
pocket did not satisfy the "plain feel" doctrine's requirement that the object felt be immediately
recognizable as evidence of a crime. Id.
22. Id. at 300-04, 654 P.2d at 103-05. The court held that the discovery of the controlled
substances in the bedroom only provided probable cause under the reasoning of Ybarra v. Illi-
nois, 444 U.S. 85 (1979) and Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692 (1981), for the detention and
arrest of the occupant of the residence, Broadnax. The court noted that only Broadnax had con-
structive control over the residence, which could connect him to criminal activity conducted
there. To connect Thompson, a visitor to the residence, to the drugs found in the bedroom, the
State would have had to show "independent factors" tying Thompson to them. However, the
State only charged Thompson with possession of the heroin found in his shirt pocket. Thus, the
court's discussion of whether probable cause for his arrest existed due to the discovery of other
drugs would seem to be immaterial, as the heroin on Thompson was found prior to the discov-
ery, and not incident to an arrest for possession of the other drugs. The court likely intended this
portion of its opinion to serve as a counter-argument to Justice Dolliver's argument, in dissent,
for the application of the inevitable discovery exception to the exclusionary rule in this case, dis-
cussed infra.
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son's pocket, that evidence should have been suppressed by the trial
court due to the violation of Thompson's federal23 and state2 4 consti-
tutional rights to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. 25
Justice James Dolliver, in his dissenting opinion, did not dispute
the court's conclusion that the detective performed an unconstitutional
search of Thompson, resulting in the discovery of evidence tainted by
illegality. Dolliver contended, however, that probable cause to arrest
Thompson was established when the controlled substances were found
in the bedroom. 26 Referring to the undisputed testimony that the dis-
covery of contraband in the bedroom occurred "5 or 10 seconds" after
the detective discovered the heroin in Thompson's shirt pocket, 27 Jus-
tice Dolliver suggested that the court should adopt the inevitable dis-
covery rule and apply it to this case.28 Under the version of the
doctrine described by Dolliver, the prosecution could avoid suppres-
sion of tainted evidence if it proved that "(1) The police did not act
unreasonably or to accelerate the discovery of evidence in question; (2)
proper and predictable investigatory procedures would have been uti-
lized; and (3) those procedures would have inevitably resulted in the
discovery of the evidence in question. "29
Beyond a description of the elements of the inevitable discovery
doctrine itself, Dolliver did not elaborate on the practical implications
23. "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated...." U.S. CONST. amend IV,
quoted in Broadnax, 98 Wash. 2d at 293, 654 P.2d at 99.
24. "No person shall be disturbed in his private affairs, or his home invaded, without
authority of law." WASH. CONST. art. 1, § 7, quoted in Broadnax, 98 Wash. 2d at 293, 654 P.2d
at 99.
25. Id. at 304, 654 P.2d at 105.
26. Id. at 307-08, 654 P.2d at 107. Justice Dolliver contended that the court's reliance on
the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Ybarra, in conjunction with Summers, was based on a mis-
interpretation of those cases. Dolliver argued that the present case could be distinguished from
Ybarra because the affidavit for the search warrant in Ybarra did not indicate that the premises to
be searched were used for drug trafficking, and, indeed, no contraband was found at the location
except on Ybarra's person. In contrast, according to Justice Dolliver:
[W]e have "presence" (of Thompson) plus a validly executed search warrant to enter
premises where drug trafficking was suspected and the subsequent discovery of the
contraband in plain view in a bedroom of the house.
Given these circumstances, to hold Thompson was not subject to arrest is to make
one wonder what, if any, additional "independent factors" would prompt the majority
to find probable cause for arrest.
98 Wash. 2d at 307, 654 P.2d at 107 (emphasis in original). Justice Dolliver disagreed with the
court's ruling that Summers would only allow the arrest of Broadnax, as the only person with
constructive control of the premises. Justice Dolliver likened Summers to Thompson, because
both were arrested after contraband was discovered in plain view during a lawful search of prem-
ises suspected of drug traffic. Id.
27. 98 Wash. 2d at 308, 654 P.2d at 107.
28. Id. at 308-09, 654 P.2d at 107-08.
29. Id. at 309, 654 P.2d at 108.
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of its adoption. He did not indicate what level of proof would be the
State's burden. Nor did Justice Dolliver feel a need to distinguish, as
other courts had,3° between the doctrine's applicability to primary evi-
dence (that evidence recovered during the commission of an unreason-
able search or seizure) versus derivative evidence (by-product evidence
that resulted from, but was not found during, the unreasonable search
or seizure).3 1 Regarding the frequency and circumstances of using the
inevitable discovery exception, Dolliver simply noted that "[i]n carv-
ing out the 'inevitable discovery' exception to the taint doctrine, courts
must use a surgeon's scalpel and not a meat axe. "32
Dolliver applied the rule of inevitable discovery he had described
to the facts of the present case, holding that the detective did not act
unreasonably given the circumstances. The detective knew that the
house had been suspected of drug trafficking, and he had first seen
Thompson inside with his hands on top of his head after other officers
had explored much of the house.3 3 It would not have been unreason-
able for the detective to conclude that Thompson was under arrest,
and subject to a full search of his person.34 Furthermore, because the
30. See, e.g., State v. Crossen, 536 P.2d 1263 (Or. Ct. App. 1975), discussed in 5 WAYNE
R. LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE § 11.4, at 241 n.55 (3d ed. 1996). In Crossen, one officer unrea-
sonably searched the defendant and recovered drugs while a radio check was being run to deter-
mine whether the defendant was wanted by the police. Crossen, 536 P.2d at 1264. The officers
quickly learned over their radios that there were outstanding felony warrants for the defendant's
arrest. Id. The State, attempting to invoke the inevitable discovery rule, argued that the defen-
dant would have been arrested for the warrants and then properly searched incident to arrest,
resulting in the recovery of the drugs on his person. Id. The court rejected the State's argument,
holding that application of the inevitable discovery doctrine to primary evidence would weaken
the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule, and "would encourage unlawful searches in the hope
that probable cause would be developed after the fact." Id.
31. In Broadnax, for example, the evidence used against the defendant, Thompson, was
"primary," because it was discovered during the unreasonable search. In contrast, if Thompson
had been arrested for the drugs found in the bedroom, and then searched, the heroin would have
been "derivative" tainted evidence. According to the court, the evidence was tainted, because
probable cause did not exist to arrest Thompson, and his seizure was therefore unreasonable.
Broadnax, 98 Wash. 2d at 295, 654 P.2d at 101. Another example of the distinction between
primary and derivative evidence is found in Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984), discussed
infra. In Nix, an officer obtained incriminating statements from the defendant during an illegally
conducted interrogation. The statements themselves, obtained during the course of the interroga-
tion, were primary evidence resulting from illegal police conduct. Information contained in the
defendant's statements led police to the discovery of the victim's body. The body itself was
derivative evidence resulting from the police illegality, as it was not found during the illegal
police conduct, but later, as a by-product of the misconduct. Id. at 443.
32. 98 Wash. 2d at 310, 654 P.2d at 108, quoting 5 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND
SEIZURE, § 11.4, at 624 (3d ed. 1996). Dolliver further contended that careful application of the
inevitable discovery rule would protect societal interests in effective law enforcement while still
deterring official misconduct. Id.
33. Broadnax, 98 Wash. 2d at 309, 654 P.2d at 108.
34. Id.
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officers were lawfully in the house to search for illegal drugs, it was
proper and predictable that the drugs would have been found in plain
view in the bedroom, and that Thompson would have then been
arrested."5 Finally, Dolliver concluded that the detective would have
properly searched Thompson incident to his arrest, and that the detec-
tive would have inevitably discovered the heroin in Thompson's pock-
et, albeit a few seconds later than the detective actually did.36
III. Nix v. WILLIAMS-INEVITABLE DISCOVERY GETS U.S.
SUPREME COURT APPROVAL
At the appellate level, Washington courts did not discuss inevi-
table discovery for the next two years. In the interim, the U.S.
Supreme Court announced its acceptance of a different version of
inevitable discovery in Nix v. Williams. 7 In Nix, the Court refused to
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. 467 U.S. 431 (1984). This case is often referred to as "Williams II," in reference to
Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977). Williams had been suspected of abducting a ten year-
old girl in Des Moines, Iowa, on December 24, 1968. Nix, 467 U.S. at 434. The abductee had
not been seen since her disappearance on that date. Information provided by a witness and
through the discovery of the girl's clothing in Williams' abandoned car, found the following day,
led police to direct their investigation toward Williams. Id. at 435. On December 26, the Iowa
Bureau of Criminal Investigation began a statewide search for the girl. Id. After speaking with
an attorney, Williams surrendered to police in Davenport, Iowa, on December 26. Id. He was
promptly arraigned on child abduction charges, although the victim's body had not been found.
Des Moines police detectives arrived in Davenport to transport Williams back to Des Moines,
having promised Williams' attorney that they would not interrogate Williams during the trip.
Id. However, while en route to Des Moines, one of the detectives spoke to Williams, saying that
snow was expected, which would make discovery of the girl's body difficult. Id. The detective
told Williams to think about the fact that Williams was "the only person that knows where this
little girl's body is" and "that the parents of this little girl should be entitled to a Christian burial
for the little girl who was snatched away from them on Christmas [Elve and murdered...
[A]fter a snow storm [we may not be] able to find it at all." Id. at 435-36. The detective told
Williams of his belief that the body was in an area that was en route to Des Moines. Id. at 436.
The detective did not explicitly ask for any information from Williams, stating "I do not want
you to answer me ... Just think about it..." Id. Williams then made several incriminating
statements and, a short while later, directed the officers to the body. A search team was two and
one-half miles from where the body was found, "essentially within the area to be searched." Id.
The officers who had been conducting the search in the area had called off their own search and
joined the Des Moines detectives transporting Williams. Id. at 436.
During Williams' first trial for first-degree murder, his attorney moved to suppress evidence
of the incriminating statements, the body, and all related evidence, such as autopsy results, on
the grounds that such evidence was the "tainted fruit" of Williams' statements in the police car,
obtained in violation of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Id. at 437-38. The motion was
denied; during the trial, the detective who elicited the statements admitted that he had been try-
ing to get as much information from Williams as possible before Williams could speak with his
attorney again. Id., citing Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977). Williams was convicted,
and his conviction was affirmed by the Iowa Supreme Court. Nix, 467 U.S. at 437. The U.S.
Supreme Court, however, upheld a federal district court's habeas corpus ruling that the evidence
was tainted by the defendant's interrogation in violation of his right to counsel. Nix, 467 U.S. at
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reverse an Iowa state court's murder conviction of Robert Williams,
who had been convicted of killing a young girl and disposing of her
body in a ditch beside a gravel road.38 The trial court admitted evi-
dence from the victim's body, despite objection that the evidence was
derived from a police officer's violation of Williams' Sixth Amend-
ment right to counsel.39 The trial court concluded that the State had
proved by preponderance of the evidence that, had Williams not led
the police to the body, the police would have discovered her body
within a short period of time in largely the same condition.4" Williams
was convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment.41
The Supreme Court of Iowa affirmed the conviction.42 The
court held that the evidence of the body and its condition could be
admitted under a "hypothetical independent source" exception to the
exclusionary rule,43 essentially equivalent to the inevitable discovery
doctrine. Under the Iowa rule, the State would be required to prove
by preponderance of the evidence that the police did not act "in bad
faith for the purpose of hastening discovery of the evidence in ques-
tion," and that the evidence "would have been discovered by lawful
means."44 The state supreme court concluded that, despite evidence
of the interrogating detective's express admission that he was trying to
provoke Williams into providing information out of the presence of
his counsel, such police behavior did not constitute bad faith conduct
for the purpose of hastening the discovery of the body.4" The court
also found that the body would have been discovered lawfully, in the
course of a statewide search then being conducted under the supervi-
sion of the Iowa Bureau of Criminal Investigation. 46
The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Iowa
rejected Williams' writ for habeas corpus relief, agreeing with the
Iowa Supreme Court's conclusions regarding the applicability of inevi-
table discovery.47 However, the Eighth Circuit of the U.S. Court of
437, citing Brewer, 430 U.S. at 387. The Court noted that while the incriminating statements
could not be admitted at the retrial, evidence of the body and its condition could be admissible
"on the theory that the body would have been discovered in any event, even had incriminating
statements not been elicited from Williams." Nix, 467 U.S. 437, quoting Brewer, 430 U.S. at
407 n.12. The retrial of the case formed the basis for the decision in Nix.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 437-38.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 438.
42. Id. at 438, citing Iowa v. Williams, 285 N.W.2d 248 (Iowa 1979).
43. Id. at 438, citing Williams, 285 N.W.2d at 260.
44. Williams, 285 N.W.2d at 260.
45. Nix, 467 U.S. at 438, citing Williams, 285 N.W.2d at 260-61.
46. Id. at 439.
47. Id.
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Appeals reversed,4" on the grounds that the State had provided insuffi-
cient proof that the detective had not acted in bad faith, thus failing to
meet the standards of the state for shielding improperly obtained
evidence."
The Supreme Court elected to take a different approach to the
case. As the Court noted in its discussion of the case, "[The Eighth
Circuit] assumed, without deciding, that there is an inevitable discov-
ery exception to the exclusionary rule. . .," The Court observed that
the "vast majority of all courts, both state and federal, recognize an
inevitable discovery exception to the exclusionary rule."'" Tracing the
history of the exclusionary rule as it applied to derivative evidence, or"tainted fruit,"2 the Court reached several important conclusions.
First, the Court identified that neither of the two then-existing excep-
tions to the exclusionary rule-the "independent source" and "attenu-
ation" exceptions-required that the prosecution prove that the offi-
cers acted in "good faith" when performing the illegal search or sei-
zure that led to the derivative evidence.53 Second, the Court observed
that the existing exceptions to the exclusionary rule applied to viola-
tions of the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments. 4 Finally, the
Court noted the purpose of extending the exclusionary rule to deriva-
tive evidence:
48. Id. at 439, citing Nix v. Williams, 700 F.2d 1164 (8th Cir. 1983).
49. Id. at 440, citing Nix v. Williams, 700 F.2d at 1169-70.
50. Id. at 439.
51. Id. at 440. By 1984, when the Court decided Nix, every U.S. Court of Appeals had
endorsed the inevitable discovery doctrine. Nix, 467 U.S. at 441 n.2. Although Washington had
not yet adopted the doctrine, many other states already had put it into practice. See, e.g., People
v. Madson, 638 P.2d 18 (Colo. 1981); State v. Compton, 293 N.W.2d 372 (Minn. 1980); State v.
Bonuchi, 636 S.W.2d 338 (Mo. 1982); State v. Ercolano, 397 A.2d 1062 (N.J. 1979); People v.
Arnau, 444 N.E.2d 13 (N.Y. 1982); State v. Lowry, 667 P.2d 996 (Or. 1983).
52. Nix, 467 U.S. at 441-43. The Court examined the development of the application of
the exclusionary rule in two other cases, Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385
(1920), and Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963). To the Court, Silverthorne repre-
sented the genesis of the "derivative evidence" exclusion whereby illegally obtained evidence led
to discovery of other incriminating evidence. Nix, 467 U.S. at 441. However, the Court noted
that the holding of Silverthorne was limited, and not automatic. The Silverthorne decision left
open an "independent source" exception. "If knowledge of [such facts] is gained from an inde-
pendent source, they may be proved like any others." Id. at 441, quoting Silvertho'ne, 251 U.S. at
392 (emphasis in original). Wong Sun extended the exclusionary rule to instances where illegal
police conduct led to discovery of evidence that was the "indirect product or 'fruit' of the un-
lawful conduct.
53. Id. at 442.
54. Nix, 467 U.S. at 442, citing United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967) (Sixth
Amendment violation); Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n of New York, 378 U.S. 52 (1964) (Fifth
Amendment violation of privilege against self-incrimination). Wong Sun involved a violation of
the Fourth Amendment's protection against unreasonable searches and seizures. See Wong Sun,
371 U.S. at 484.
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The core rationale ... has been that this admittedly drastic and
socially costly course is needed to deter police from violations of
constitutional and statutory protections. This Court has
accepted the argument that the way to ensure such protections is
to exclude evidence seized as a result of such violations notwith-
standing the high social cost of letting persons obviously guilty
go unpunished for their crimes. On this rationale, the prosecu-
tion is not to be put in a better position than it would have been
in if no illegality had transpired."5
Although the exclusionary rule operated to deter police miscon-
duct, the rule's reach was limited. Rather than punish police officers
by imposing fines or otherwise holding them criminally or civilly
liable for the violation of the defendant's constitutional rights, the
courts simply refused to recognize the officers' ill-gotten gains. The
independent source exception recognized that the prosecution should
not be put in a worse position due to some earlier police error or mis-
conduct.5 6 While the independent source exception was not applicable
to the present case,5 7 the idea behind it-that exclusion of evidence
should serve only to return the police to the identical position in which
they would have been without the misconduct-was relevant.5 8 In this
case, the Court reasoned that returning the police to the same position
that they would have been in without their misconduct would mean
that the Des Moines detectives would have never called off the search,
and that the search party would have soon discovered the body. To
exclude the evidence of the body would be to act as if a lawful search
effort-one that, according to the Court, would have inevitably led to
discovery of the body-had never existed. Thus, exclusion of the evi-
dence would have put the police and the prosecution in a worse position
than they would have been in even if the detective's misconduct had
never occurred. They would be deprived of the inevitable result of
perfectly legal investigative techniques that were otherwise at their
disposal. Thus:
55. Nix, 467 U.S. at 442-43.
56. Id. at 443. Under the independent source doctrine, derivative evidence that bears the
taint of illegality will not be suppressed if the prosecution can show that it had an "independent,
legitimate source for the disputed evidence." Id. at 442 n.2, citing Murphy, 378 U.S. 52.
57. Id. at 443. Under the independent source exception, the prosecution must show an
existing lawful investigation through which the police would have discovered the derivative evi-
dence, which occurred simultaneously with, yet separate from, the actions of misbehaving offi-
cers. In Nix, while there was a search party within fairly close proximity to the victim's body,
that search had been called off after notice by the Des Moines detectives that Williams was ready
to talk. There was no actual and simultaneous independent source for the discovery of the vic-
tim's body. The discovery was solely due to Williams' improperly obtained statements. Id. at
448-49.
58. Id. at 443-44.
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If the prosecution can establish by a preponderance of the evi-
dence that the information ultimately or inevitably would have
been discovered by lawful means-here, the volunteers'
search-then the deterrence rationale has so little basis that the
evidence should be received. Anything less would reject logic,
experience, and common sense."
The Court refused to add a good-faith element to the inevitable
discovery exception, rejecting the contention, raised by the Eighth
Circuit, that refusal to require a good-faith showing would encourage
police misconduct.6" The Court, citing United States v. Ceccolini,"1
noted that the deterrent power of the exclusionary rule is only effective
when a police officer realizes the likely consequences of engaging in
misconduct.62 The Court reasoned that most officers knowingly
"faced with the opportunity to obtain evidence illegally will rarely, if
ever, be in a position to calculate whether the evidence sought would
inevitably be discovered."63  In situations where an officer is aware
that the evidence will be inevitably discovered, an officer has few
incentives (and many disincentives, such as departmental discipline
and exposure to civil liability) to take "dubious 'shortcuts' to obtain
the evidence."64
IV. NIX AND BROADNAX COMPARED
It would be a mistake to read Nix as putting the U.S. Supreme
Court's stamp of approval on Justice Dolliver's definition of the
inevitable discovery exception in State v. Broadnax, as the two cases
feature versions of the exception that differ both in theory and in
application.
First, Nix limited itself to derivative evidence-the fruit of the
poisonous tree, as opposed to the immediate products of the illegal
search or seizure.65 Dolliver, on the other hand, would have extended
59. Id. at 444. In adopting a preponderance of the evidence standard of proof, the Court
rejected Williams' argument that a higher standard, such as clear and convincing evidence, was
called for by United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967). Nix, 467 U.S. at 444 n.5. While
Wade required the higher standard of proof due to the difficulty of determining whether an in-
court identification was based on permissible or impermissible line-up procedures, inevitable dis-
covery "focuses on demonstrated historical facts capable of ready verification or impeachment
and does not require a departure from the usual burden of proof at suppression hearings." Id.
60. Nix, 467 U.S. at 445.
61. 435 U.S. 268 (1978).
62. Nix, 467 U.S. at 445.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 446. As will be discussed infra, under a system of appropriately careful applica-
tion of the inevitable discovery exception, perhaps the greatest obstacle to an officer would be the
difficulty of establishing a sufficient showing of "inevitability."
65. Id. at 444.
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the exception to reach the primary evidence found in Thompson's
shirt pocket.66
Second, the Supreme Court in Nix approved of inevitable discov-
ery to prevent the suppression of evidence obtained in violation of a
defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel.67 The Supreme Court
did not rule on the exception's applicability to violations of the Fourth
and Fifth Amendments.68 Dolliver, in contrast, would have applied
the inevitable discovery exception to avoid suppression of evidence
obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment's protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures. 69
Finally, Nix explicitly rejected the requirement that the prosecu-
tion show good faith on the part of the officers.7" Justice Dolliver
would have required that the prosecution show not merely that the
police acted in good faith, but rather that the officers did not act
unreasonably or to accelerate the discovery of the evidence in ques-
tion."71 While Justice Dolliver's reasonableness requirement certainly
would appear to limit application of the inevitable discovery excep-
tion, his use of the exception expands its range significantly, bringing
all violations that trigger the exclusionary rule into its reach and allow-
ing inevitable discovery to prevent suppression of primary evidence.
V. INEVITABLE DISCOVERY IN WASHINGTON POST-NIX:
THE EARLY YEARS
Twelve days after the U.S. Supreme Court decided Nix, Division
One approved, in dicta, of the inevitable discovery exception in State
v. Reid." Reid involved an appeal from a first-degree murder convic-
tion on the grounds that key pieces of evidence were the "tainted
fruit" of earlier illegal seizures committed by police.73 Although the
66. Broadnax, 98 Wash. 2d 289, 310, 654 P.2d 98, 108 (1982).
67. Nix, 467 U.S. at 446.
68. In Nix, the Court did observe that it allowed the admissibility of illegally obtained evi-
dence under the attenuation exception in situations where the police had violated the Fourth,
Fifth, or Sixth Amendments. Id. at 442. The Court did not, however, expressly rule that the
inevitable discovery exception had a similarly broad reach.
69. Broadnax, 98 Wash. 2d at 309-10, 654 P.2d at 108.
70. Nix, 467 U.S. at 446.
71. Broadnax, 98 Wash. 2d at 309, 654 P.2d at 108.
72. 38 Wash. App. 203, 687 P.2d 861 (1984), rev. denied, 102 Wash. 2d 1025 (1984).
73. Reid, 38 Wash. App. at 207, 687 P.2d at 865. In Reid, the defendant and his wife had
been involved in a shotgun murder the previous evening. Based on information gathered at the
scene of the killing, officers traced Reid to an apartment building. Id. at 205, 687 P.2d at 864.
Because the officers did not know which apartment belonged to Reid, they waited outside,
watching a parked car that they believed belonged to Reid. Id. When Reid came out of his
apartment and started his car, the officers arrested him and placed him in a patrol car. Id. One
of the officers removed the keys from the car. Id. at 205-06, 687 P.2d at 864. Believing that
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appellate court upheld the allegedly illegal initial seizure, the court
determined, for the sake of argument, that even if the initial seizure
were illegal, the attenuation doctrine still would have allowed admis-
sion of the questioned derivative evidence. 4 In a footnote, the court
noted that, although the prosecution did not argue for an inevitable
discovery exception, it would certainly have applied.7" "Accordingly,"
the court stated, "suppression was not required even if the evidence
was otherwise tainted by illegality."76
Following Reid, Washington courts declined to address, for over
a decade, whether they would accept inevitable discovery. In the
course of argument in several appellate cases, prosecutors advanced
the inevitable discovery exception as an alternative ground for the
Reid's wife was in the apartment, had likely witnessed his arrest, and was likely in possession of
the shotgun, the officers felt that they were in physical danger. Id. at 206, 687 P.2d at 864. The
officers claimed that they felt unable to secure the apartment building without putting other offi-
cers in danger. Id. After learning from Reid's neighbors that he lived in a particular apartment,
one officer used one of Reid's keys to open the apartment door. Id. The officers announced their
entry, and found Reid's wife hiding behind a door. Id. The officers placed her under arrest and
secured the apartment. Id. They later obtained a search warrant for the apartment and discov-
ered incriminating photographs and other evidence. Id. Reid argued, both pretrial and on
appeal, that photographs and other evidence were the fruit of an illegal seizure of his car keys and
should have been suppressed.
74. Id. at 208-09, 687 P.2d 865-66. Division One held that the keys, even if impermissibly
seized, were not used to locate the apartment so as to exploit the seizure, but to "facilitate access"
to the apartment and to confirm Reid's relationship with the apartment. Id. at 209, 687 P.2d at
866. The seizure of the photographs and other evidence during execution of a later lawful search
warrant was sufficiently attenuated from the seizure of the keys to be admissible. Id.
75. Id. at 209, n.6, 687 P.2d at 866 n.5, citing both Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984),
and State v. Broadnax, 98 Wash. 2d 289, 308, 654 P.2d 96, 107 (1982) (Dolliver, J., dissenting).
Division One did not indicate whether it was adopting the Nix approach to inevitable discovery
or Justice Dolliver's approach as outlined in Broadnax.
76. Id. at 209 n.6, 687 P.2d at 866 n.5. If, assuming arguendo, the initial seizure was unrea-
sonable, the court has taken great liberties with the doctrine of inevitable discovery. The court
seemed to reason, without stating directly, that a warrant would have been inevitably obtained
following Reid's arrest. By extension, the court appears to argue that the execution of a search
warrant would have inevitably resulted in discovery of the photographs at a later time. Further-
more, to apply inevitable discovery, the court would first have "returned" the officers to their
status prior to seizing the keys. At that point in time, Reid's wife would still be inside the apart-
ment and, without the keys, the police would have had to find some other means of getting her
out of the apartment, in order to assure their safety. The court refers to this possibility by noting
that the police would have been justified in forcibly entering the apartment. Id. at 209 n.5, 687
P.2d at 866 n.4. Thus, the court indicates that application of inevitable discovery would be
appropriate in two distinct situations.
In the first, the officers would have inevitably obtained a warrant and then would have
inevitably discovered photographs at a later date. Alternatively, the police, returned to a presei-
zure status, would have inevitably made a forced entry into the apartment, removed the wife
before she destroyed any incriminating evidence, inevitably obtained a search warrant, and then
inevitably discovered the photographs. In either of these situations, it is difficult to find the
"demonstrated historical facts capable of ready verification or impeachment," Nix, 467 U.S. at
444 n.5, necessary for application of the inevitable discovery exception.
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admissibility of questioned evidence, but the courts declined to con-
sider whether to accept the exception.77
VI. STATE V. WHITE AND STATE V. WARNER: Two SHIPS
PASSING IN THE NIGHT?
In the span of three weeks in February 1995, inevitable discovery
began to take shape in Washington. In State v. White,78 decided on
February 6, the defendant sought reversal of his conviction for posses-
sion of cocaine with intent to deliver on the grounds that the evidence
of cocaine and cash used to convict him was the product of an illegal
search. 79 A Seattle Police Department officer observed White appear-
ing to engage in a street-sale narcotics transaction and then walking
into a nearby restaurant.8" The observing officer radioed another
officer on the "arrest team" to apprehend White.81 The arresting offi-
cer learned from the restaurant manager that White was in the rest-
room.82 The officer proceeded to the restroom, observing that only
one stall was occupied and that the occupant was wearing pants and
shoes matching White's description.83
The officer looked over the door of the stall and observed White
sitting on the toilet with his pants down and cash lying on his under-
wear."4 The officer ordered White to exit the stall and to leave his
77. See, e.g., State v. Coates, 107 Wash. 2d 882, 735 P.2d 64 (1987). In Coates, the State
conceded, on appeal, that evidence found pursuant to a search warrant was illegally obtained,
because the warrant had been issued upon an affidavit containing information gathered in viola-
tion of the defendant's Miranda rights. Coates, 107 Wash. 2d at 886, 735 P.2d at 67. The State
argued for the adoption and application of the inevitable discovery exception. Id. The Wash-
ington Supreme Court declined to rule on inevitable discovery at all, holding instead that because
there was sufficient probable cause to issue the warrant even without the illegally obtained infor-
mation, the evidence in question had not in fact been illegally seized. Id. at 888-89, 735 P.2d at
68. See also State v. Feller, 60 Wash. App. 678, 806 P.2d 776 (1991) (denying State's argument
for consideration of inevitable discovery, on grounds that the exception had not been adopted in
Washington, citing Coates); State v. Smith, 119 Wash. 2d 675, 835 P.2d 1025 (1992) (declining
to address State's argument for inevitable discovery, on alternate grounds that the evidence was
not illegally seized nor had inevitable discovery been adopted in the state, citing Feller).
In each of these cases, the State was seeking application of inevitable discovery to primary
evidence, despite the fact that the U.S. Supreme Court in Nix had ruled only on the admissibility
of derivative evidence under the inevitable discovery exception.
78. 76 Wash. App. 801, 888 P.2d 169 (1995), affd, 129 Wash. 2d 105, 915 P.2d 1099
(1996). The supreme court affirmed the legality of the disputed search, while not discussing
inevitable discovery.
79. White, 76 Wash. App. at 802, 888 P.2d at 170.
80. Id. at 803, 888 P.2d at 170.
81. Id. at 803, 888 P.2d at 170-71.
82. Id. at 803, 888 P.2d at 171.
83. Id. at 804, 888 P.2d at 171.
84. Id.
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pants down."5 After handcuffing White, the officer performed a com-
plete search incident to arrest, removing the currency from White's
underwear, along with sixteen rocks of cocaine, a pager, and more
money from his jacket.8 6 The trial court denied White's motion for
suppression of each of these items. 7
Division One upheld the legality of the officer's search of the
toilet stall.8 Nevertheless, the court argued that even had the search
been unreasonable, all of the evidence would have been admitted
under the inevitable discovery exception. 9 The court referred to the
Supreme Court's recognition of inevitable discovery in Nix and noted
that the exception had not been formally adopted in Washington."
The court then proceeded to apply Justice Dolliver's version of inevi-
table discovery as discussed in his dissent in Broadnax.91 The court
explained:
[T]he circumstances in this case illustrate why this jurisdiction
should adopt [inevitable discovery]-had the initial search of the
toilet stall been unconstitutional, the evidence recovered from
the lawful search incident to arrest potentially would have been
subject to suppression under the exclusionary rule. We do not
consider this a result required by the Fourth Amendment.92
Less than three weeks later, the Washington Supreme Court, in
State v. Warner,93 recognized the inevitable discovery exception in a
case involving an alleged violation of the defendant's Fifth Amend-
ment privilege against self-incrimination. In Warner, the prosecution
appealed the trial court's dismissal of four of five counts of first-degree
rape of a child. The trial court had determined that the counts were
based on statements made by the defendant while participating in
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 807, 888 P.2d at 172-73. The court held that although the search did not fall
under the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement, where "the police have
probable cause to believe that a crime has been, is being, or is about to be committed and that the
suspect is in a toilet stall, it is reasonable to search the stall for that person notwithstanding the
warrant requirement." Id. at 807, 888 P.2d at 173.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 808, 888 P.2d at 173.
91. Id. at 809, 888 P.2d at 173-74, citing Broadnax, 98 Wash. 2d 289, 304, 654 P.2d 96,
108 (1982). Applying the Broadnax standard, the court found that all of the requisite findings
would have been met had inevitable discovery been argued, that is, that (1) the officer did not act
unreasonably in searching the stall; (2) the defendant would have been lawfully searched incident
to arrest even if the officer had not looked into the stall; and (3) the search incident to arrest
would have led to the discovery of the same evidence. Id. at 809, 888 P.2d at 174.
92. Id. at 808-09, 888 P.2d at 173 (emphasis added).
93. 125 Wash. 2d 876, 889 P.2d 479 (1995).
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court-ordered sex offender treatment, in violation of the Miranda pro-
tection against custodial interrogation. 4
The Supreme Court of Washington held, in part, that the trial
court made insufficient factual determinations as to whether Warner's
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination had been vio-
lated.9" Remanding to the trial court, the supreme court advised that
if Warner's privilege were in fact abused, the proper remedy would be
suppression of the incriminating statements rather than dismissal of
the counts.96 Noting that any evidence found as a direct result of the
incriminating statements must also be suppressed as "fruit of the poi-
sonous tree," the supreme court advised the trial court to consider the
inevitable discovery exception on remand. 7 Citing to Nix, the Warner
court defined inevitable discovery in pure Nix terms,98 without any
reference to Justice Dolliver's dissent in Broadnax or to any of the later
cases that had cited to Broadnax, including White. Furthermore, the
Supreme Court of Washington failed to elaborate on application of the
inevitable discovery exception to admit evidence obtained in violation
of the defendant's Fifth Amendment rights, even though the Nix
Court affirmatively approved its use only in Sixth Amendment situa-
tions. Because the supreme court was remanding, it did not explain
how inevitable discovery would apply to the facts of the instant case.99
94. Id. at 881-82, 889 P.2d at 481.
95. Id. at 888, 889 P.2d at 484.
96. Id. at 888, 889 P.2d at 485, citing United States v. Blue, 384 U.S. 251 (1966).
97. Id. at 888-89, 889 P.2d at 484-85.
98. Id. at 889, 889 P.2d at 485. The Warner court defined inevitable discovery as approved
in Nix as limited to derivative evidence. In the instant case, while the incriminating statements
must be suppressed, any evidence that was discovered as a result could be subject to the inevita-
ble discovery exception. Id. The Warner court did not require a showing of reasonableness as to
the behavior of the violating officers-the prosecution need only prove that the "challenged evi-
dence would have been discovered eventually by lawful means." Id., citing Nix, 467 U.S. at 444.
Finally, the Warner court, citing United States v. Brookins, 614 F.2d 1037 (5th Cir. 1980), held
that absolute inevitability was not required; it required only a "reasonable probability" that the
disputed evidence would have been discovered from other than the tainted source. Warner, 125
Wash. 2d at 889, 889 P.2d at 485.
99. The trial court would have had a difficult time properly applying inevitable discovery
to the facts of the case. While participating in the sex offender program, Warner admitted to
committing various crimes against different individuals. Warner, 125 Wash. 2d at 880-81, 889
P.2d at 480. Warner was "apparently told" by his counselors that Child Protective Services
(CPS) would be informed of his revelations, although it was unclear whether he was told before
he made his disclosures that they could be used against him. Id. at 881, 889 P.2d at 480. War-
ner phoned the parents of one of his victims to inform them that he had abused their child. Id.
It was unclear whether the counselors or the victim's family made the initial referral to CPS; nev-
ertheless, CPS began an investigation that led to Warner's charge in the instant case. Id. at 881,
889 P.2d at 481.
By noting the potential applicability of inevitable discovery, the state supreme court seemed
to suggest that either (1) notification of CPS by the victim's family would have been an inevitable
result of Warner's decision to phone his victims, thus removing the taint if it turned out that
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Thus, within the span of a month, inevitable discovery had been
adopted by two Washington courts in markedly different ways,
reflecting the differences between Nix and Justice Dolliver's approach
in Broadnax. Despite the deference that would seem to be due to the
Nix/ Warner approach to inevitable discovery, Justice Dolliver and the
White decision have, so far, commanded much of the attention of the
few appellate courts considering inevitable discovery."°°
VII. STATE V. RICHMAN-INEVITABLE DISCOVERY WITHSTANDS
STATE CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS
State v. Richman,' decided in 1997, provides a good example of
a judicially accepted application of the inevitable discovery rule as
currently formulated by Division One. Richman was apprehended by
the manager of a clothing store upon suspicion of shoplifting. °2 As
the police officers entered the office where Richman was being
detained, Richman was removing his coat, revealing a suit jacket and
other clothes belonging to the store.10 3 Additional stolen clothing
found in Richman's briefcase became the subject of dispute at trial.
The officer who searched the briefcase could not recall whether he had
CPS had been notified by the counselors of the treatment program, in violation of Miranda, or
(2) that the victims would have inevitably come forward even without Warner's intervention.
See id. at 889, 889 P.2d at 485 (stating that "[t]here is a very long statute of limitations in these
cases... which allows the victims until they reach 21 years of age to come forward. This statute,
therefore, increases the likelihood of eventual discovery.").
In either of these potential situations, it is difficult to find the "demonstrated historical facts
capable of ready verification or impeachment," Nix, 467 U.S. 431, 445 n.5 (1984), that are
required for a finding of inevitable discovery. Particularly compared to White, where it was
essentially clear that the defendant was going to be arrested prior to the officer's illegal search
and that the incident search would have discovered the same evidence, the Warner court's under-
standing of inevitable discovery seems strained.
100. See, e.g., State v. Richman, 85 Wash. App. 568, 933 P.2d 1088 (1997) (examining and
affirming the Dolliver definition, via White, under WASH. CONST. art. 1, § 7; discussed infra);
State v. Sullivan, No. 39399-5-I, 1998 WL 100536 (Wash. Ct. App. Mar. 9, 1998) rev. denied,
136 Wash. 2d 1024, 969 P.2d 1065 (1998) (unpublished opinion); State v. Garoutte, No. 21622-
1-I, 1997 WL 724962 (Wash. Ct. App. Nov. 21, 1997) (unpublished opinion). Indeed, in
reviewing Division One's decision in White, the Washington Supreme Court declined to address
the discrepancy between its own adoption of Nix's version of inevitable discovery and that
adopted by the court of appeals. See State v. White, 129 Wash. 2d 105, 113, 915 P.2d 1099,
1103 (1996).
101. 85 Wash. App. 568, 933 P.2d 1088 (1997), rev. denied, 133 Wash. 2d 1028, 950 P.2d
478 (1997).
102. Richman, 85 Wash. App. at 570, 933 P.2d at 1089. The manager observed price tags
and an empty suit hanger in the dressing room just after Richman left it. Id. at 570, 933 P.2d at
1090. After chasing Richman down in a parking garage, the store manager brought Richman to
the garage office. Id. When the manager began to phone the police, Richman told him, "If you
hang up, I will give you the merchandise back." The manager continued his call to the police.
Id. at 570, 933 P.2d at 1090.
103. Id. at 571, 933 P.2d at 1090.
Seattle University Law Review
arrested Richman before he opened the briefcase or afterward, inci-
dental to Richman's arrest. 10 4
Division One upheld the trial court's refusal to suppress the
items found in the briefcase under the doctrine of inevitable discovery.
The appellate court examined the inevitable discovery exception as
elucidated in White. First, the officer's search of the briefcase, even if
performed prior to Richman's arrest, was reasonable, given that the
officer had probable cause to arrest Richman before discovering the
contents of the briefcase. 1°5 Also, because probable cause had existed
to support the arrest without the evidence found in the briefcase, Divi-
sion One affirmed the trial court's conclusion that Richman would
inevitably have been arrested regardless of the briefcase search.0 6
Finally, because searches of objects within the immediate control of
the arrestee are routine, and because the briefcase was within Rich-
man's control, it inevitably would have been searched incident to
Richman's arrest. 10 7
The Richman court determined that the inevitable discovery
exception did not violate federal Fourth Amendment rights or privacy
rights protected by article 1, section 7 of the state constitution. 08 The
court paid particular attention to the possibility, alleged by Richman,
that guarantees of article 1, section 7 would be destroyed if courts were
to engage in hypothetical analysis that would, according to Richman,"reward" the police for improper seizures.19
The Richman court undertook state constitutional analysis of
inevitable discovery under the premise that the exclusionary rule's
rationale is the deterrence of unlawful police conduct. " ' The court
104. Id.
105. Id. at 579, 933 P.2d at 1093-94. Division One held that Richman's privacy interest
had been compromised by the probable cause that the officer had to arrest him. According to the
court, an officer can lawfully search objects within an arrestee's control immediately before the
moment of arrest. Id. at 578, 933 P.2d at 1093, citing State v. Smith, 119 Wash. 2d 675, 682-83,
835 P.2d 1025 (1992). Thus, the court implied that even if the officer had opened the briefcase
prior to placing Richman under arrest, the officer essentially had probable cause to do so in any
case. Why then, if the search was a justifiable warrantless search, did the court decide it needed
to engage in an inevitable discovery analysis? The Richman court did not articulate its motiva-
tion for providing alternate grounds for admission of this type of evidence. This strained scru-
tiny, necessitated by the "reasonableness" or "good faith" requirement, highlights the weakness
of the formulations of inevitable discovery that employ those requirements, as discussed infra.
106. Id. at 579, 933 P.2d at 1094.
107. Id. at 579, 933 P.2d at 1093.
108. Id. at 576-77, 933 P.2d at 1092-93.
109. Id. at 574, 933 P.2d at 1091.
110. Richman, 85 Wash. App. at 575, 933 P.2d at 1092. Cf. State v. Rife, 133 Wash. 2d
140, 148, 943 P.2d 266, 270 (1997) (stating that the "primary objectives" of the exclusionary rule
are the protection of the individual's privacy interests, deterrence of police misconduct, and pres-
ervation of judicial integrity, in descending order of importance.)
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paid heed to the argument that the exclusionary rule also serves to
protect individual rights, not merely to curb governmental action.
Even accepting this additional basis for the exclusionary rule, the
Richman court decided that individual rights would not be jeopardized
by inevitable discovery, because the prosecution would have to show
that the same evidence would have been discovered by constitutionally
permissible means."' Finally, the Richman court noted that requiring
reasonableness on the discovering officer's part was of particular
import to state constitutional analysis.112
A court considering whether privacy rights protected by the
Washington Constitution have been improperly infringed must con-
sider whether the expectation of privacy is reasonable. "[B]y analyz-
ing the reasonableness of the officer's actions in light of the privacy
interest at stake," the Richman court held, "courts can ensure that
application of the inevitable discovery doctrine does not erode the
protection of article 1, section 7." 13
Thus, on these bases, the Richman court-the most recent
Washington court to fully discuss or apply inevitable discovery in a
published opinion-accepted inevitable discovery as articulated in
White. The Richman court did not explain why the inevitable discov-
ery doctrine could reach beyond the guidelines of Nix to prevent sup-
pression of primary evidence, or why it was applicable to violations of
the Fourth and Fifth Amendments.
VIII. WHERE SHOULD INEVITABLE DISCOVERY Go?
Inevitable discovery, as it has developed in Washington, can be
described in the following terms: where any evidence, primary or
derivative, would ordinarily be suppressed pursuant to the exclusion-
ary rule, it will be admitted so long as the prosecution can show, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that the same evidence would have
been inevitably discovered by lawful police procedures. Furthermore,
the evidence that would have been inevitably discovered will be
admitted only if the officers who violated the defendant's constitu-
tional rights did so reasonably or without the intent to accelerate dis-
covery of the evidence.
The courts have not elaborated on general rules governing the
types of facts that are required to make such showings of inevitability,
nor have they had many opportunities to elaborate on the "reason-
ableness" requirement. The courts have never addressed the reason-
111. Richman, 85 Wash. App. at 576, 933 P.2d at 1092.
112. Id. at 577-78, 933 P.2d at 1093.
113. Id.
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ing behind the leap from Nix's application of inevitable discovery to
derivative evidence to the application to primary evidence, first sug-
gested by Justice Dolliver in Broadnax and later adopted by Division
One in White and Richman. The lack of jurisprudential foundation
must be accounted for, and the courts, particularly the Washington
Supreme Court, ought to provide more reasoning for the guidance of
the courts, practitioners in criminal justice, and the general citizenry,
who have a necessary stake in the workings of the justice system and
the protections of the federal and state constitutions.
The expansion of inevitable discovery to allow the admission of
primary evidence--evidence discovered during and as a direct result of
the police illegality-is foremost in need of explication. Allowing
admission of primary evidence has been the subject of much debate
among commentators and courts outside Washington."' Several
states, including New York11 and Texas," 6 have expressly recognized
the difference between primary and derivative evidence. These courts
believe that although the taint of illegality can be erased from deriva-
tive evidence without jeopardizing the Fourth Amendment and/or a
state constitutional cognate, primary evidence must be suppressed. As
one New York Court of Appeals opinion noted:
We hold that applying the inevitable discovery rule [to primary
evidence] ... would amount to a post hoc rationalization of the
initial wrong... and would be an unacceptable dilution of the
exclusionary rule. It would defeat a primary purpose of that
rule, deterrence of police misconduct. [To admit such evidence]
would encourage unlawful searches in the hope that probable
cause would be developed after the fact." 7
The strongest argument for the admission of primary evidence
under the inevitable discovery exception can be found in its close rela-
tive, the independent source doctrine. The independent source doc-
trine allows admission of evidence that is "actually found by legal
means through sources unrelated to the illegal search. '118 Under the
independent source doctrine, evidence is admitted because it was
114. See Robert M. Bloom, Inevitable Discovery: An Exception Beyond the Fruits, 20
AMERICAN JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW, 79, 87-88 (1992) (noting that "[t]he expansion to
primary evidence of the inevitable discovery exception... has great ramifications on the contin-
ued vitality of the exclusionary rule.")
115. See People v. Stith, 506 N.E.2d 911, 914 (N.Y. 1987).
116. See Reed v. Texas, 809 S.W.2d 940, 944 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991). Oregon has also
refused to apply inevitable discovery to primary evidence. See State v. Crossen, 536 P.2d 1263
(Or. Ct. App. 1975); see also supra text accompanying note 30.
117. Stith, 506 N.E.2d at 914, quoting in part State v. Crossen, 536 P.2d 1263, 1264 (Or.
1975).
118. United States v. Ramirez-Sandoval, 872 F.2d 1392, 1396 (9th Cir. 1989).
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acquired by legal means and therefore does not fall under the exclu-
sionary rule's umbrella.1 9 The evidence was not found as a result of
any unlawful conduct, but rather independently from it. 2 ° The inde-
pendent source doctrine does not distinguish between primary and
derivative evidence, because the rationale for admission of each is
identical.' 2'
The similarity to the inevitable discovery rule is clear.'22 Inevi-
table discovery asks a question that has already been answered in an
independent source analysis: but for the misconduct, would the same
evidence have been discovered by lawful means?'23 If so, then the
exclusionary rule need not apply, because independent grounds justify
admission of the evidence.
Of course, when applying an independent source test, the lawful
source exists in fact. Inevitable discovery, on the other hand, relies on
speculation. This reality does not prohibit admission of primary evi-
dence. Instead, it demands that courts be rigorous when conducting
an inevitable discovery analysis, demanding a sufficient demonstration
of inevitability that does not rely too heavily on wishful thinking by
the prosecutor. Such rigor will discourage misconduct, as police will
not assume judicial approval. However, once a court determines the
inevitability of lawful discovery of the same evidence, there is little
reason to prohibit admission of evidence on the basis of whether it is
derivative or primary.
The Richman decision allowed admission of primary evidence,
but it insisted that the state constitution required the prosecution to
show the inherent "reasonableness" of the officer's illegality.'24 The
Richman court's discussion was circular. The Richman approach
requires that, after the difficult process of demonstrating historical
facts that prove inevitability, the officer's conduct must be examined
in the context of the reasonableness of the individual's expectation of
privacy. 2 ' This approach unnecessarily revisits the initial determina-
119. Seeid.
120. See id.
121. See Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 540-41 (1988). In Murray, the U.S.
Supreme Court noted that such a distinction "would produce results bearing no relation to the
policies of the exclusionary rule." Murray, 487 U.S. at 541. See also United States v. Zapata, 18
F.3d 971, 979 n.7 (1st Cir. 1994) (adapting the Murray Court's rejection of the distinction
between primary and derivative evidence under the independent source exception to permit
admission of primary evidence under the inevitable discovery exception.)
122. Some courts use the term "hypothetical independent source" rather than "inevitable
discovery." See, e.g., State v. Holman, 707 P.2d 493, 502 (Idaho Ct. App. 1985) (noting that
the doctrine of inevitable discovery relates to hypothetical independent sources.).
123. See id.
124. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
125. State v. Richman, 85 Wash. App. 568, 577-78, 933 P.2d 1088, 1093 (1997), rev.
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tion of exclusion. When initially determining whether the police per-
formed an illegal seizure, the individual's reasonable expectation of
privacy is examined. As the individual's expectation of privacy
becomes less reasonable, under the Richman/White doctrine, the offi-
cer's conduct becomes more reasonable, and less likely, therefore, to
have implicated the individual's constitutional protections in the first
place.
A redetermination of the reasonableness on the part of the officer
is unnecessary. The exclusionary rule's deterrent effect prevents the
police from using the benefits of their misconduct-it returns the
police to the position they would have been in before their misbehav-
ior.126 Requiring the prosecution to prove reasonableness in addition
to inevitability, however, would impose burdens unrelated to the
rationale behind the exclusionary rule.
There are two steps of analysis in a proper inevitable discovery
application. First, is the evidence the product of an improper search
or seizure? If so, then the exclusionary rule is triggered, resulting in
the suppression of the evidence because of police misconduct. In that
situation, the police are returned to the position they occupied prior to
engaging in misconduct. Second, having returned to the premiscon-
duct status quo, would the police have inevitably discovered the same
evidence by lawful means? The prosecution must overcome a formi-
dable obstacle-proving inevitability-to prevent suppression. If the
answer to the second question is affirmative, then the exclusionary
rule has not lost its impact. The police still have not gained from their
misconduct. If there was no proof that the evidence would have been
inevitably discovered, it still would not be admitted. If the prosecu-
tion is successful, the police have simply not been put in a worse posi-
tion than they otherwise would have been due to the application of the
exclusionary rule. The quality of the misconduct does not diminish
the inevitability of discovery.
The Richman court noted that article 1, section 7 of the state con-
stitution provides broader protections than the U.S. Constitution.
12 7
Are Washington courts now prepared to rule that the quality of the
misconduct requires primary and secondary exclusionary rules-the
first determining application of the exclusionary rule, and the second
determining whether the quality of misconduct prohibits inevitable
discovery, and, very likely, the independent source exception?'28 To
denied, 133 Wash. 2d 1028, 950 P.2d 478 (1997).
126. Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 443 (1984).
127. Richman, 85 Wash. App. at 573, 933 P.2d at 1091, citing State v. Hendrickson, 129
Wash. 2d 61, 70, 917 P.2d 563 (1996).
128. This Comment does not suggest that the nature of the misconduct should not be con-
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do so would allow the court to twice punish the police and the prose-
cution, first by returning them to the position they would be in with-
out misconduct, and then by putting them in a worse position. The
deterrent power of the exclusionary rule has thus been geometrically
increased, to the detriment not only of prosecutors and police inter-
ested in obtaining convictions, but to the general public as well. It is
worth repeating that very often the evidence that is subject to suppres-
sion clearly indicates the defendant's guilt. The police misconduct
bears no relation to the probative value of the evidence, which is often
most damning.
The protection of the rights of the individual from unreasonable
governmental action, mentioned in Richman and more directly
asserted in State v. Rife,'29 would be better served by a rigorous defi-
nition of "inevitability" than by a requirement of "reasonableness."
Because the extent to which liberal application of the inevitable dis-
covery doctrine affects the strength of constitutional guarantees, care-
ful application of inevitable discovery should stress "inevitability"
over "eventuality." Because the preponderance of evidence standard
is applied, any lesser likelihood than near-certainty of discovery would
render the deterrent and protective effects of the exclusionary rule
meaningless. If the exclusionary rule is to deter police misconduct,
police officers must know that inevitable discovery is not an "easy
out"-they must be aware that courts will demand a significant
showing to override the implications of their misconduct.
For instance, application of inevitable discovery as a means of
avoiding the warrant requirement would almost never be appropriate.
A court should not, in hindsight, rule that another court would have
inevitably issued a warrant. To do so would render the warrant
requirement of the Fourth Amendment meaningless, because police
judgment as to the inevitability of the issuance of a warrant would
replace the independent analysis of a neutral judge.13° Thus, inevita-
sidered in an attenuation exception context, where consideration of the lasting effects of the mis-
conduct on the production of the evidence is essential. In an inevitable discovery context, the
police have been returned to the position they occupied before engaging in misconduct, and the
relevant inquiry is whether, assuming that no misconduct occurred, the same evidence would
have been inevitably found.
129. 133 Wash. 2d 140, 148, 943 P.2d 266, 269 (1997).
130. See State v. Handtmann, 437 N.W.2d 830 (N.D. 1989), cited in 5 WAYNE R.
LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE § 11.4, at 246 (3d ed. 1996). In Handtmann, the State sought
admission of evidence obtained during search authorized under a warrant later found lacking in
probable cause. Handtmann, 437 N.W.2d at 836. The State argued that if the invalid warrant
had not been obtained when it was, additional evidence would have been presented that would
have, according to the State, inevitably resulted in the issuance of a valid warrant. Id. The
North Dakota Supreme Court held that:
[T]he inevitable-discovery doctrine may not be applied to encourage shortcuts for law
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ble discovery should only apply when the evidence would have been
discovered in the course of a lawful warrantless search.
Furthermore, as the Ninth Circuit requires, the factual support
that makes discovery inevitable must "arise from circumstances other
than those disclosed by the illegal search itself." '131 Also, a court deter-
mining suppression should pay close attention to the inherent
unpredictability of the defendant and outside actors (such as, in State
v. Reid, the presence of Reid's wife).'32 Where actors outside of police
control could have predictably had an effect on the location or exis-
tence of evidence that was discovered by unlawful police procedure,
enforcement officials which eliminate a neutral and detached magistrate's probable-
cause determination.... Application of the inevitable-discovery doctrine in this case
would encourage law-enforcement shortcuts whenever evidence may be more readily
obtained by unlawful means-a result at odds with the purpose of the exclusionary
rule to deter police from obtaining evidence in an illegal manner. Moreover, judicial
sanctioning of the doctrine in this case would also encourage incomplete police inves-
tigations in the hope that information subsequently discovered would cure a defective
warrant.
Handtmann, 437 N.W.2d at 838.
Nevertheless, Division One appears ready to officially take this leap. See State v. Roush, No.
40178-5-1, 1999 WL 211851 (Wash. Ct. App. Apr. 12, 1999) (unpublished opinion). In Roush,
an officer discovered a gun inside the defendant's lunchbox, which he had left at his workplace.
See Roush, 1999 WL 211851 at *2. The officer did not have a search warrant. Id. at *3. At the
same time that the officer was searching the workplace, the defendant disclosed the location of
the pistol to detectives at the police station. Id. at *2. One of the interviewing detectives testi-
fied that he would have sought a search warrant had the offending officer not found the gun. Id.
The trial court ruled that the defendant had no expectation of privacy in his lunchbox, but
even if he had, the pistol would have been inevitably discovered. See id. at *4. Division One
upheld the admission of the gun solely on the basis of inevitable discovery. The appellate court
held that the police would indeed have sought a search warrant, and the warrant "would have
issued." Id.
Circumstances such as these, where an important piece of evidence in the prosecution of a
serious violent crime could be excluded, might seem to call for application of the inevitable dis-
covery exception and abandonment of the warrant requirement. However, as the Handtmann
court observed, it may lead to unwanted results. The Fourth Amendment recognizes the buffer
role that a neutral magistrate serves. Officers could foreseeably be tempted to engage in war-
rantless searches with the expectation that courts would be unwilling to suppress damning evi-
dence on the basis of the lack of a warrant. The courts would lose their protective role, and the
frequency of unconstitutional and unnecessary searches would predictably increase. The value
of the exclusionary rule would decrease.
In contrast, application of inevitable discovery in the context of exceptions to the warrant
requirement is appropriate. Very often, an officer will mistakenly believe that a warrant is always
unnecessary under the circumstances, and only later discover his or her error. The deterrent
power of the exclusionary rule has no effect in such cases. However, as in Roush, at least one
detective recognized the need for a warrant. Time was not a factor, as the defendant was in cus-
tody. Where such detachment and lack of exigency is present, failure to enforce the Fourth
Amendment's warrant requirement unreasonably diminishes the role of the neutral and detached
magistrate.
131. United States v. Ramirez-Sandoval, 872 F.2d 1392, 1396 (9th Cir. 1989), quoting
United States v. Boatwright, 822 F.2d 862, 864-65 (9th Cir. 1987).
132. See supra note 73.
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inevitability will be almost impossible to prove. If a prosecutor can
show that a hypothetical independent source would have led to the
discovery of the same evidence, but at a time distant from when the
actual, illegal discovery occurred, courts would be rightly dubious as
to the "inevitability" of discovering the same evidence in the same
condition.
IX. CONCLUSION
As Wayne R. LaFave notes, the arguments of critics of the
inevitable discovery rule "are directed not so much to the rule itself as
to its application in a loose and unthinking fashion." '133 The proper
use of the inevitable discovery exception is a judicial statement that
the exclusionary rule should not be imposed arbitrarily, but with
regard to the rationales underlying it. An inevitable discovery doc-
trine that is strictly regulated does not do injustice to the constitutional
protections that Washington citizens hold dear. Rather, the excep-
tion, sparingly used due to its demanding requirements, simply
affirms that there are instances where, if proper investigatory
procedures would have inevitably led to discovery of incriminating
evidence, society's interest in obtaining justice should not be defeated
by one officer's misconduct.
133. 5 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH& SEIZURE § 11.4, at 243-44 (3d ed. 1996).
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